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The recent political history of Greece highlights the risk that
the euro might become unaffordable for the mass of
Europeans
blogs.lse.ac.uk /europpblog/2013/04/04/greece-euroscepticism-2/
The Greek MYPLACE team at Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences reflect on the recent
political history of Greece. They argue that the unfolding of the ‘Grexit’ discourse, which equates the common
currency with recessionary austerity measures, holds important lessons about the broader direction of travel within
the Eurozone. 
For the last three years Greek society has been experiencing an economic, political and social collapse,
unprecedented in its post-war history, that will stigmatize it for many decades to come. This collapse has grown to
encompass all aspects of individual and collective life. The disastrous effects of successive waves of austerity and
recession are not limited to the conditions of humanitarian crisis that large parts of the population now suffer: more
than 1.3 million unemployed, 61% youth unemployment, 3.9 million under the poverty line, 70% of households
cutting back on food expenses, more than 3 thousand suicides in three years, dramatic explosion of homelessness
rates and of those without access to basic social services, health and social security rights. They have also had a
profound effect on both the structure and the substance of political life, as well as  the functioning of Greek
democracy itself.
Although these profound socio-political transformations have not yet crystallized in their entirety, both international
and national opinion surveys reveal, since 2011, certain trends indicating deeper developments both in Greece and
Europe. The dramatic deconstruction of the social fabric after the Greek 2010 financial collapse, also overturned the
social consensus that supported and legitimized the socio-political balance of power within the Third Hellenic
Democracy (founded in 1974, after the collapse of the seven year military dictatorship), the death rattle of which we
are now witnessing.
The exhaustion of the bipartite political system’s ability to integrate large parts of the population has challenged the
political consensus that previously prevailed. Thus, along with the ultimate deconstruction of the, already anemic,
social welfare and labour and social security rights, democracy itself is threatened both by the electoral rise of neo-
nazi political formations and by the emergency conditions characterizing legislative work and the functioning of the
executive.
These profound socio-political transformations have even disturbed the social consensus around the dominant
national strategy of participation in the core of EU policies and processes. The Eurobarometer findings point to
important developments regarding attitudes toward the EU. As the following graphs indicate, a move away from the
european consensus that still prevails in the Greek parliament is currently emerging.
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Moreover, Greek citizens record very low rates of trust toward the EU, while overall it tends to be seen in very
negative terms.
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Nevertheless, those who believe that the country should not abandon the common currency are still in the majority,
although those who do not demand a pro european agenda by Greek political parties are now very close to 40% and
the rates of those who think that the unification processes should move on are falling independently of political
affiliation. Similar results are recorded in national opinion polls in which the majority believe that the country’s
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problems can be better addressed on a national level and not on a European one.
As positive evaluation of Greece’s EU membership is falling to 1980s rates and levels of trust are at a record low,
some polls recorded 40% of respondents who did not see the return to the national currency as catastrophic, while
more than 80% believed that the Greek political parties should develop a “plan B” in case the country is forced to
reintroduce the national currency, the drachma.
For Greece, this process represents a major shift from the strong sociopolitical consensus toward “the country’s
European perspective” that still prevails in the Greek political system, where only one of the 7 parties represented in
the Parliament has adopted an explicit “anti-EU” agenda aiming at the country’s “discommitment” from the common
currency and the union. Moreover, Euroscepticism is also developing within all parties and despite their official
positions regarding the euro and the EU.
The decisive point for this shift can be located in mid 2011 when massive popular protests against the continuation
and sharpening of the austerity measures openly challenged the Greek government’s commitment to the EC-ECB-
IMF troika’s “internal devaluation” strategy for the first time. From that point onwards, the public debate on austerity
had been complemented by a discourse that raised the question of the ultimate benefit Greece accrues from its
participation in the eurozone.
This ‘Grexit’ discourse first appeared in the national public debate before the first austerity program and it took the
form of a negation: Greece should not default and/or exit the eurozone, contrary to what various analysts and
advisors were forecasting or proposing, in the face of the country’s inability to service its debt. The socialist
government of the time eventually adopted the role of the country’s defender against a double enemy; on the one
hand, it was striving to safeguard the country’s “European acquis” and on the other, it was struggling to master the
budget deficit and the chronic deficiencies of the market and public administration. At that initial phase, all Grexit talk
was seen as originating from “the speculators” who were trying to benefit from the crisis undermining the European
project and particularly the common currency.
However, twelve months after the first austerity program had been signed, it became clear that not only was it
impossible to achieve its goals but it was also entrenching the economic downturn. The public discontent stemming
from the consequences of austerity  gave birth to a protest movement, inspired by the Spanish Indignados, that
openly and actively challenged the policies agreed by the Greek government and the troika.
In the face of this massive challenge, international media, analysts and government officials initiated a tense debate
about the danger that a failure to implement the austerity program would lead to an official default and exit from the
eurozone. Now, Grexit discourse was no longer originating from the “speculators” but from those who objected to
austerity. They were labeled the “drachma lobby” and they were accused of provoking the country’s ultimate
destruction, as they were putting its eurozone membership in danger, as well as even its european future. Thus, the
dividing line between the austerity supporters and critics was supplemented by another between those who
identified the euro with austerity and those who rejected this identification.
The 2012 double national elections had been dominated by the Grexit descourse and its “Euro dilemma”. In its
simplest form, the Greek voters were presented with a choice  between, on the one hand, a harsh austerity regime
and an unaffordable euro and on the other, an uncontrollable economic and bank collapse and a severely devalued
drachma. This choice had been clearly formulated by the Financial Times Deutschland in their “recommendation to
the Greek citizens”, published in Greek language just a few days before the national elections took place.
The June 2012 electoral result had been a pro-austerity response to the Grexit discourse. However, it generated
more questions that are still at the heart of today’s public debates. One of them is particularly relevant to the rise of
eurosceptism in the crisis ridden Greece and it builds upon the Grexit discourse’s identification of austerity with the
euro. As the consequences of austerity and recession take the form of a humanitarian crisis in Greece, doubts are
often surfacing as to the benefits of a currency that marginalizes and excludes large parts of the population. This is
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precisely the greatest danger the common currency now faces; that it might become unaffordable for the mass of
Europeans. Are Greece and the European South now pointing in this direction?
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